Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
	Officials announcing the agreement
Created	14 July 2015
Ratified	N/A (ratification not required)
Date effective	18 October 2015 (adoption); 16 January 2016 (implementation);
Location	Vienna, Austria
Signatories	Current; Iran; United States (2018)
Purpose	Nuclear non-proliferation

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; Persian: برنامه جامع اقدام مشترک, romanized: barnāmeye jāme'e eqdāme moshtarak (برجام, BARJAM)),^[4]^[5] also known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is an agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. The agreement was finalized in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations S.C.—China, France, Russia, the U.K., U.S.—plus Germany)^[a] together with the European Union.

Formal negotiations began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the following 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework, which later led to JCPOA, along with a Roadmap Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).^[8]

Negotiations centered around sanctions relief and restrictions on Iran's nuclear facilities, including the Arak IR-40 reactor, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Gachin Uranium Mine, Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Isfahan Uranium Conversion Plant, Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, and the Parchin Military Research complex.

The agreement took effect on 20 January 2014.^[9] It was criticized and opposed in the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and by Iranian principlists.^[10]^[11]

The United States withdrew from the pact in 2018 and imposed sanctions under the policy of "maximum pressure". The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering the nuclear deal's economic provisions null.^[12]

Timeline

The agreement included a series of provisions describing actions that Iran would undertake for specified periods of time.

For 13 years, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges.

For 15 years, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67% and not to build heavy-water facilities.

For 10 years, uranium enrichment would be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges. Other facilities would be converted to avoid proliferation risks.

IAEA would have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities to monitor compliance.

In return for verifiably abiding by those provisions, Iran would receive relief from U.S., European Union, and United Nations S.C. nuclear-related sanctions.

The JCPOA formed part of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. The Security Council (S.C.) enacted it on 20 July 2015 and adopted it on 18 October.

It took effect on 16 January 2016 (Adoption Day). JCPOA was to remain in effect for eight years or until receipt by the S.C. of an IAEA report stating that IAEA had reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, and terminated ten years from Adoption Day.

On 12 October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law, but stopped short of terminating the deal.^[13]

In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. In March 2018, IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said that the organization had verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments.^[14] On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required.^[15]^[16]

On 8 May 2018, Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA.^[17]^[18]^[19] On 7 August 2018, the E.U. enacted a blocking statute to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran.^[20] In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles.^[21]

In May 2019, IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the main terms, though questions were raised about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, which was only loosely specified in the deal.^[22]

On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium,^[23] which the IAEA confirmed.^[24]

On 5 January 2020, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with IAEA.^[25]

Background

Nuclear technology

A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 (²³⁵
U) and plutonium 239 (²³⁹
Pu). Both uranium 233 (²³³
U) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used.^[26]^[27]^[28] The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium.^[29] Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 (²³⁸
U) and only 0.7% ²³⁵
U.

To make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power, although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes.^[30] Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material.^[28]^[30]

Iranian nuclear activity, 1970–2006

Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance. Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.^[31]

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology.^[31]

In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from China (which entered into an agreement with Iran in 1990), Pakistan (which did the same in 1992), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran began pursuing nuclear capability, including uranium mining and experimenting with uranium enrichment.^[31]

In August 2002 the Paris-based Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility.^[31]^[32] In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants.^[31] IAEA inspectors visited Natanz.^[32] In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but not to take samples.^[32]

In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement.^[32] Iran, faced with the prospect of a U.N. S.C. referral, entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E.U. 3).^[31]^[32] The U.S. took no part.^[32] In October 2003, Iran and the E.U. 3 agreed to the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to full IAEA cooperation, to sign the Additional Protocol, and to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment.^[31]^[32] In September and October 2003 the IAEA inspected several facilities.^[31] This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, including those related to centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution".^[31]

In August 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason.^[32]^[33] Over the following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement".^[31]^[32] Iran notified IAEA that it would resume enrichment at Esfahan.^[31]^[32]

In February 2006, Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting IAEA to refer Iran to the S.C..^[31]^[32] In April 2006 Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had explored nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons.^[32] In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1.^[32] That July, the S.C. passed its first resolution (nr. 1696), demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing.^[34]^[32] S.C. resolution 1737 was adopted in December; followed by others.^[35] The legal authority for IAEA referral and the S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter.^[35] The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities.^[31]^[32]

In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to another S.C. resolution.^[31]

S.C. resolutions, 2007–2013

Four more S.C. resolutions followed: 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010).^[35] In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides the "inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".^[35]^[b]

In 2007, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations.^[41] ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended.^[41]

A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; that estimate and U.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that Iran was maintaining its option to develop nuclear weapons".^[42]

In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom.^[43] Israel threatened military action.^[32]

Joint Plan of Action (2013)

In March 2013 the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led by William Burns and Jake Sullivan (U.S.) and Ali Asghar Khaji (Iran).^[32]^[44] In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran.^[32]^[45] In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan.^[46] In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1.^[47]

In September 2013 Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.^[32]^[47] Former officials alleged that, in order to advance the deal, the Obama administration shielded Hezbollah from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Drug Enforcement Administration's Project Cassandra investigation regarding drug smuggling.^[48]^[49] Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered an investigation.^[50]

On 24 November 2013, after several rounds of negotiations, the interim Joint Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1. It consisted of a short-term program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions.^[51] The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement.^[47] The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014.^[52] That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.^[47]^[52]

A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational. Iran agreed in the Joint Plan of Action not to commission or fuel the reactor; the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachin uranium mine; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant; the Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex.^[53]

In 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015.^[c]^[55] Under the Act, once a nuclear agreement was negotiated with Iran, Congress had 60 days in which to pass a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, or do nothing.^[56] The Act included time beyond the 60 days for the president to veto a resolution and for Congress to vote on whether to override the veto.^[57]^[56]^[58]

Provisions

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) covered 109 pages, including five annexes.^[59] The major provisions are:^[59]^[60]^[61]

Nuclear

Enrichment-related provisions^[62]^[63]^: 29
Capability	Before JCPOA	After JCPOA (for 10-year period)	After 15 years
First-generation centrifuges installed	19,138	capped at 6,104	Unconstrained^{[U 1]}
Advanced centrifuges installed	1,008	0
Centrifuge R&D	Unconstrained	Constrained
Stockpile of low-enriched uranium	7,154 kg	300 kg
Stockpile of medium-enriched uranium	196 kg	0 kg
The physical limits phase out over 10 to 15 years^[63] ^ According to the JCPOA, "The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA."

Stocks

Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg,^[64]^[59]^[65]^[66]^[67] and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for weaponry.^[65]^[66]^[68] This represented a "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium).^[65]^[66]^[67] Stocks in excess of 300 kg enriched up to 3.67% would be diluted to 0.7% or sold in return for uranium ore, while uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% was to be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to 3.67%. P5+1 agreed to facilitate commercial contracts.

After 15 years, all limits on enrichment would be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stocks of enriched uranium, and enrichment sites. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".^[63]^[69]

Centrifuges

Iran initially possessed centrifuges sufficient for one nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power.^[70] Over ten years, Iran would secure over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, reducing active units to 6,104 centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium.^[59]^[65] Enrichment would be restricted to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there were limited to IR-1 centrifuges, Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran would warehouse its advanced IR-2M centrifuges during this period.^[53]^[66]^[67] Non-operating centrifuges would be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but could be used to replace failed centrifuges.^[71]^[72] Iran agreed to build no enrichment facilities for 15 years.^[65]

Research

Iran could continue research and development work on enrichment only at the Natanz facility and had to respect specific limitations for eight years.^[53] The intent was to maintain a one-year breakout interval.^[65]

Reactors

With cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), Iran was permitted to modernize the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design. Arak was to be limited to 20 MWt to support allowed research and production, while minimizing plutonium production and avoiding weapons-grade plutonium.^[73] Spent fuel was to be sent out of the country.^[53] All heavy water beyond Iran's reactor needs was to be exportable. In exchange, Iran imported 130 tonnes of uranium ore in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to import 130 tonnes in 2017.^[74] For 15 years Iran agreed not to research or engage in spent fuel reprocessing,^[75] build additional heavy-water reactors, or accumulate heavy water.^[53]

Fordow would stop researching and enriching uranium for at least 15 years. The facility was to be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years Fordow would maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing. Two of the six cascades would be transitioned for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. The other four would remain idle. Iran agreed to keep no fissile material there.^[53]^[65]^[67]

An Additional Protocol extended the monitoring and verification provisions for as long as Iran remained a party to the NPT.^[76]

Inspections

A comprehensive inspections regime would monitor and confirm Iranian compliance.^[65]^[66]^[d]

The IAEA was to have multilayered^[87] oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies".^[88] For sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA was to have 24-hour access to nuclear facilities and to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment).^[88]^[89] The agreement authorized the IAEA to use sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic equipment seals that could send the IAEA information; satellite imagery to detect covert sites; sensors to detect minute nuclear specimens; and tamper- and radiation-resistant cameras.^[90]^[91] Other tools included software to gather information and detect anomalies, and datasets on imports.^[87] The number of inspectors tripled to 150.^[90]

Inspectors could request access, informing Iran of the basis of the request, to verify the absence of prohibited activities and nuclear materials.^[89] The inspectors were to come only from countries with which Iran had diplomatic relations.^[92] Iran could either allow the inspection or propose alternatives that satisfied the IAEA's concerns.^[89] If the inspectors were not satisfied, a 24-day process would ensue.^[89] Iran and the IAEA were to have 14 days to reach agreement.^[89] For the following week a majority of the Commission could require Iran to take specific actions within three more days.^[93]^[94] This allowed the U.S. and its allies to insist on responses that Iran, Russia or China could not veto.^[93]^[95] After three days of non-compliance, sanctions would be automatically reimposed.^[94]

Breakout

These provisions were intended to extend the "breakout time"—the interval during which Iran could prepare enough material for a single nuclear weapon—from two to three months to one year.^[59]^[65]^[96]^[e] Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs^[63] and Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation^[98]^[99] supported these estimates. By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at University of Texas at Austin, disagreed, arguing that the breakout time would be only three months.^[100]

After ten years or more, the breakout time would gradually decrease.^[59]^[96] By the 15th year, U.S. officials said the breakout time would return to the status quo ante of a few months.^[59]^[96] The Belfer Center report stated: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."^[63]

Exemptions

Iran was granted exemptions prior to 16 January 2016. Their reported purpose was to enable sanctions relief and other benefits to start by that date. The exemptions allowed Iran to:^[101]

exceed the 300 kg of 3.5% LEU limit;
exceed the zero kg of 20% LEU limit;
keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size limit;
maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceeded the 130-tonne limit by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman.^[102]

Sanctions

Iran had to submit a full report on its nuclear history before it could receive any sanctions relief.^[103] At the time of the agreement, Iran was subject to a variety of sanctions imposed by an array of organizations. Once IAEA verified compliance with the nuclear-related measures, U.N. sanctions would terminate. Some E.U. sanctions would terminate and some would suspend. That would allow Iran to recover approximately $100 billion of its assets frozen in overseas banks.^[104] No U.N. or E.U. nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures were to be imposed.^[105]

Additional E.U. sanctions would be lifted after eight years of compliance, including some on the Revolutionary Guards.^[106]

The U.S. agreed to suspend its nuclear-related secondary sanctions.^[107]^[108] This was not tied to a date or compliance but was expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016".^[107]^[109]^[110] Some sanctions would continue: those on conventional weapon sales for five years; those on ballistic missile technologies for eight.^[59]^[111] But sanctions related to human rights, missiles, and support for terrorism remained in effect.^[67]^[112] Many U.S. sanctions apply worldwide; E.U. sanctions apply only in Europe.^[106]

Snapback

Any of the P5+1 could invoke a "snapback" provision, under which sanctions would be reimposed.^[65]^[66]^[105] Snapback sanctions would not apply retroactively to previously allowed contracts.^[71]

Dispute resolution

Any party could refer allegations of non-compliance to the Joint Commission monitoring body.^[67]^[113] Complaints by a non-Iran party that were not resolved to the complainant's satisfaction within 35 days would allow the complainant to cease performing its commitments, notify the S.C., or both.^[113] The S.C. would then have 30 days to adopt a resolution to continue the sanctions relief. Absent such a resolution, nuclear-related U.N. sanctions would automatically be reimposed. Iran said it would then cease performing its nuclear obligations.^[114]^[113] This would allow any permanent S.C. member (U.S., United Kingdom, China, Russia or France) to veto sanctions relief.

This procedure implied that the U.S., U.K., or France could reinstitute sanctions if it concluded that Iran was non-compliant,^[113] though since that might cause Iran to withdraw from the agreement, they might be reluctant to do so.^[115]

Expiration

After 15 years, many provisions of the JCPOA would expire, including most enrichment provisions.^[116]

International reaction

[67] According to the JCPOA, "The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA."

[8] The P5+1 are also sometimes referred to as the "E3+3", for the "EU three" countries (France, the UK, and Germany) plus the three non-EU countries (the U.S., Russia, and China). The terms are interchangeable; this article uses the "P5+1" phrase.^[6]^[7]

[42] The meaning of Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and its application to Iran, is a matter of dispute.^[36]^[37] Gary Samore writes, "Whether the NPT guarantees signatories a right to enrichment is a long-standing dispute among the parties to the treaty."^[38] Iran and other countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and South Africa) assert that signatories to the NPT have a right to enrich uranium under Article IV of the NPT.^[39]^[40] Professor William O. Beeman of the University of Minnesota, as well as Henry D. Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, agree with this interpretation of the NPT.^[39] The U.S. position was unclear before 2006, but after that time the U.S. has taken the position that Iran does not have the right to uranium enrichment because this activity is not specifically cited in the NPT.^[37]^[39] In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2013, Sherman stated, "the U.S. position that that article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty does not speak about the right of enrichment at all [and] doesn't speak to enrichment, period. It simply says that you have the right to research and development. And many countries such as Japan and Germany have taken that [uranium enrichment] to be a right. But the United States does not take that position. ... We do not believe there is an inherent right by anyone to enrichment."^[39] The U.S. officials has also made the additional argument that whatever Iran's rights under the NPT might be, they were superseded by a series of UN Security Council resolutions demanding "that Iran suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities until 'confidence is restored in the purely peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.'"^[37]^[38]^[39] U.S. Secretary of State Kerry has said: "We do not recognize a right to enrich. It is clear ... in the nonproliferation treaty, it's very, very (clear) that there is no right to enrich. [The Iranians] have the ability to negotiate it, but they could only gain that capacity to have some enrichment as some countries do, if they live up to the whole set of terms necessary to prove it's a peaceful program."^[36] In March 2011 testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed a similar position, indicating that Iran should be permitted to enrich uranium under IAEA supervision once the international concerns over its nuclear program are resolved.^[40]

[57] The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub.L. 114–17, was an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.^[54]

[91] At the same time that the JCPOA was agreed to, Iran and the IAEA signed a separate document, the Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.^[77] The roadmap includes "the provision by Iran of explanations regarding outstanding issues" and provides "for technical expert meetings, technical measures and discussions, as well as a separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin", an Iranian military research and development site.^[77] "The specific measures that Iran is committed to take with respect to technical expert meetings and discussions and access to Parchin are contained in two separate documents between Iran and the IAEA that are not public."^[77] On 19 August 2015, the Associated Press reported that an anonymous official had given the AP an unsigned, preliminary draft of one of the confidential bilateral IAEA-Iran agreements. This draft indicated that Iran would be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate the Parchin site.^[78] (The AP reported that two anonymous officials had told it that the draft does not differ from the final, confidential agreement between the IAEA and Iran).^[79] The AP said that the draft "diverges from normal procedures".^[78] Several hours after posting the article, the AP removed several details of the story (without issuing a formal retraction), and published another article that noted, "IAEA staff will monitor Iranian personnel as they inspect the Parchin nuclear site."^[80] The AP restored the contentious details the next morning and said it was standing by its entire story. It further published the full document it had transcribed.^[81] The following day, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano issued a statement stating: "I am disturbed by statements suggesting that the IAEA has given responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran. Such statements misrepresent the way in which we will undertake this important verification work ... the arrangements are technically sound and consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise our safeguards standards in any way. The Road-map between Iran and the IAEA is a very robust agreement, with strict timelines, which will help us to clarify past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme."^[82] The IAEA did not elaborate on the provisions of the confidential agreement, but the Arms Control Association has noted, "under managed access procedures that may be employed the IAEA, the inspected party may take environmental swipe samples at a particular site in the presence of the IAEA inspectors using swabs and containment bags provided by the IAEA to prevent cross contamination. According to former IAEA officials, this is an established procedure. Such swipe samples collected at suspect sites under managed access would likely be divided into six packages: three are taken by the IAEA for analysis at its Seibersdorf Analytical Lab and two to be sent to the IAEA's Network of Analytical Labs (NWAL), which comprises some 16 labs in different countries, and another package to be kept under joint IAEA and Iran seal at the IAEA office in Iran a backup and control sample if re-analysis might be required at a later stage. The process ensures the integrity of the inspection operation and the samples for all parties."^[83] Mark Hibbs of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Thomas Shea, a former IAEA safeguards official and head of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory described a similar protocol in an article titled "No, Iran is not allowed to inspect itself."^[84] Hibbs and Shea wrote that the claims that Iran would be in charge of inspections at Parchin were "wholly specious" and "unfounded".^[84] Arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis of the Monterey Institute of International Studies stated that the procedures referred to in the AP report were consistent with expert practice: "There are precedents for just providing photos and videos. When the South Africans disabled their nuclear test shaft, they video-recorded it and sent the IAEA their video. I don't care who takes a swipe sample or who takes a photograph, so long as I know where and when it was taken, with very high confidence, and I know that it hasn't been tampered with."^[80] Lewis expressed the opinion that "the point of the leak was to make the IAEA agreement on Parchin sound as bad as possible, and to generate political attention in Washington."^[80] On 21 September 2015, both the Associated Press and Reuters noted that under the arrangement between Iran and the IAEA, Iranian technicians, instead of the IAEA's experts, would take environmental samples. Reuters also reported that a spokesman for Iran's atomic energy agency said Iranian nuclear experts have "taken environmental samples from Parchin without U.N. inspectors present".^[85]^[86]

[103] Ali Vaez, the senior analyst on Iran at the International Crisis Group, notes that breakout time is not precisely measurable and is "estimated rather than calculated", depending on various assumptions and factors. Vaez notes, "Breakout estimates ... usually assume that an Iranian dash for the bomb would face none of the technical challenges that have plagued the program over the past decade."^[97]

[170] The extent to which the JCPOA is legally binding on the United States—i.e., whether a future president could lawfully repudiate the JCPOA once it goes into effect—is a matter of dispute. Legal scholars Bruce Ackerman of Yale Law School and David Golove of the New York University School of Law argue that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 had the effect of making the agreement (once implemented) into a congressional-executive agreement.^[158] Golove states that the president cannot "ignore commitments [made by him or by a past president] in congressional-executive agreements without congressional authority to do so", and believes that the agreement is binding under international law, irrespective of any White House declaration, because it contains no provision saying otherwise.^[158]^[159] Ackerman agrees, arguing, "Presidents do not have the power to repudiate congressional-executive agreements without strictly following the procedures laid out by Congress in its original authorizing legislation."^[158] Others, such as Michael Ramsey of the University of San Diego School of Law, argue that unless Congress expressly approves of the agreement via a resolution of approval (which is unlikely), the agreement is nonbinding under domestic law, so that "this president can implement to the extent of his statutory and constitutional authority [and] future presidents can refuse to follow."^[158] Ramsey points out, however, that even if the agreement is a nonbinding executive agreement under domestic law, it may still be binding under international law, since domestic invalidity is not a defense to failure to follow an international agreement.^[158]
The position of the U.S. government is different. Secretary of State Kerry stated in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, "with respect to the talks, we've been clear from the beginning. We're not negotiating a, quote, 'legally binding plan.' We're negotiating a plan that will have in it a capacity for enforcement."^[160] (Kerry also said that a future president is, as a practical matter, unlikely to "turn around and just nullify it" given the international agreement from the other P5+1 powers.^[161]) Several legal scholars support this argument. John B. Bellinger III argues: "The next president will have the legal right under both domestic and international law to scrap the JCPOA and reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions on Iran."^[162] Bellinger states that "such an action would be inconsistent with political commitments made by the Obama administration and would likely cause a major rift with U.S. allies and Iran to resume its nuclear activities," but that "would not constitute a violation of international law, because the JCPOA is not legally binding".^[162] Orde Kittrie of Arizona State University similarly writes that the JCPOA is a kind of "nonbinding, unsigned political" agreement considered "more flexible than treaties or other legally binding international agreements".^[163]

[181] The "vast majority of international agreements" negotiated by the United States, especially in recent decades, have been executive agreements, rather than treaties.^[166]^[167] In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court held in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, "our cases have recognized that the President has authority to make 'executive agreements' with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic."^[168]^[169] Various opponents of the JCPOA, including David B. Rivkin Jr., Lee A. Casey, and Michael Ramsey have criticized the form of the agreement, arguing that it should be considered a treaty rather than an executive agreement.^[170]^[171] Other commentators disagree; the constitutionality of the executive agreement form of the JCPOA has been defended by Jack Goldsmith, who called arguments for the illegality of the agreement "weak",^[172] and by John Yoo, who wrote that the executive agreement form of the JCPOA is consistent with the Treaty Clause of the Constitution.^[173]

[275] "Much of the criticism of the deal" from opponents in the U.S. Congress and from the Israeli government "derives from the fact that slowing and shrinking Iran's nuclear program this way falls well short of the original diplomatic goal, which was to end entirely Iran's ability to enrich uranium—the 'zero enrichment' goal".^[260] Before the JCPOA, there was "a preference on the part of the United States and many of its allies for zero enrichment in Iran (indeed, opposition to the spread of any uranium enrichment capability to any additional countries has been long-standing U.S. policy and an important nonproliferation principle)", although "the potential to discuss with Iran the conditions under which it could continue enrichment is not new" and was "built into the proposals that the P5+1 have offered Iran since 2006, spanning the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations".^[261]
Some commentators, such as Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (writing in 2013), argued for a "zero enrichment" approach: i.e., that no agreement contemplating any enrichment by Iran should be made.^[262] This was also the position of Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who introduced the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, a proposed bill (not enacted) which would require that Iran reduce its uranium enrichment to zero before an agreement is made.^[263]
Other commentators have said that "zero enrichment" has long been an implausible goal, including R. Nicholas Burns of Harvard's Belfer Center, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and leading figure on Iranian nuclear matters during the second Bush administration, said that this was implausible given that Iran has 19,000 centrifuges, stating: "If I could get an ideal solution, or you could, where the Iranians submitted to every demand we had, I would take that. In a real world, you have to make real-world decisions."^[260] Similarly, Michael A. Levi of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations argued in the August–September 2011 edition of the journal Survival, "it is far from clear that zero enrichment is a realistic goal" and stated, "the goal of current U.S. policy, even if it is not typically articulated this way", is "limited enrichment, in which Iran has some non-trivial enrichment capability, but is unable to produce a bomb (or small arsenal) without risking strong international retaliation, including military destruction of its enrichment infrastructure".^[264] Similar arguments have been advanced by Mark Jansson, adjunct fellow at the Federation of American Scientists (who wrote in October 2013 in The National Interest, "there is nothing clear-eyed or realistic about the demand for zero enrichment" and "nor is it technically necessary" to prevent proliferation)^[265] and George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (who argued in January 2014 in Foreign Affairs, "the complete elimination of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program" is not "an achievable goal" and what is needed is "not the cessation of Iran's nuclear enrichment but its capacity to create a nuclear weapon quickly").^[266]

[283] Scholars differ on whether a "better deal" from the American point of view is realistic. Stephen M. Walt of Harvard, writing an article titled "The Myth of the Better Deal" in Foreign Policy magazine, argued that the idea of an achievable better deal is "magical thinking" that is at odds with the facts and "ignores Diplomacy 101".^[271] Albert Carnesale of Harvard's Belfer Center wrote, "there is no real alternative that would serve the interests of the United States and our allies and friends as well as the deal that is now before Congress. A 'better deal' is unachievable; a military solution is unrealistic (and probably would be counterproductive); and an international agreement without U.S. participation is less attractive than an agreement in which the United States has a strong voice in resolving of issues that might arise."^[272] Conversely, Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues, "a better deal with Iran is possible," and that congressional rejection of the agreement would not immediately result in the collapse of the JCPOA or military action,^[273] and law professor Orde Kittrie of Arizona State University argued that Congress could send the JCPOA back for renegotiation.^[163]

[301] A similar resolution of disapproval was introduced on 16 July by Representative Peter Roskam, Republican of Illinois, who announced on 3 August that he had obtained 218 cosponsors (a majority of the House).^[279]^[288]^[289] But Roskam's resolution "is not the formal disapproval measure that the House is expected to take up in September";^[279] and it was expected that it is the resolution by Royce, as the relevant committee chair, will be the one ultimately voted upon.^[288] Ultimately, neither resolution was voted upon.^[290]

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[422] [https://nournews.ir/en/news/199235/Grossi-JCPOA-is-an-empty-shell "Grossi: JCPOA is an empty shell" nournews. Accessed Nov 13 2024.

[423] "IAEA chief on Tehran visit for talks with Iranian officials" nournews. Accessed Nov 13 2024.

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v t e
Diplomatic posts	Embassy of Iran, Washington, D.C. Ambassadors of Iran to the United States Embassy of the United States, Tehran Ambassadors of the United States to Iran Interests Section of Iran in the United States Consulate-General of the United States, Tabriz Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Iran–United States Claims Tribunal Iranian Directorate Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group
Diplomacy	Persian Corridor Persian Gulf Command Nationalization of the Iranian oil industry 1953 Iranian coup d'état Abadan Crisis Timeline Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Exercise Delawar Project Dark Gene Safari Club Island of Stability Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's letter to George W. Bush Correspondence between Barack Obama and Ali Khamenei Phone conversation between Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Negotiations Joint Plan of Action Framework Reactions Criticism Aftermath U.S. withdrawal
Conflicts	Iran–Iraq War United States support for Iraq Bridgeton incident Iran Air Flight 655 Iran Ajr Iran–Contra affair Operation Staunch Operation Eager Glacier Operation Earnest Will Operation Prime Chance Operation Nimble Archer Operation Praying Mantis Syrian civil war Yemeni Civil War Arab–Israeli alliance Abraham Accords February 2019 Warsaw Conference Iran–Israel proxy conflict Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition International Maritime Security Construct Assassination of Qasem Soleimani reactions Thirteen revenge scenarios Donald Trump's threat for the destruction of Iranian cultural sites Operation Martyr Soleimani 2020 Camp Taji attacks
Incidents after 1979	Assassination of Paul R. Shaffer and John H. Turner Iranian revolution Iran hostage crisis Timeline Guadeloupe Conference Operation Credible Sport Operation Eagle Claw Canadian Caper Jimmy Carter's engagement with Ruhollah Khomeini 1980 October Surprise theory Negotiations Algiers Accords America can't do a damn thing against us Beirut barracks bombings Khobar Towers bombing Lawrence Franklin espionage scandal Disappearance of Robert Levinson United States kill or capture strategy in Iraq United States raid on the Iranian Liaison Office in Erbil Kidnapping of Jalal Sharafi 2008 Naval dispute Filipino Monkey Project Cassandra Detention of American hikers United States diplomatic cables leak 2011 alleged Iran assassination plot Strait of Hormuz dispute RQ-170 incident MV Maersk Tigris 2016 Naval incident Nuclear program of Iran Timeline P5+1 Operation Merlin Charming Kitten Stuxnet Kidnapping of Hossein Alikhani Arrest of Meng Wanzhou Deportation of Iranian students at US airports May 2019 Gulf of Oman incident June 2019 Gulf of Oman incident 2019 Iranian shoot-down of American drone 2019 K-1 Air Base attack December 2019 United States airstrikes in Iraq and Syria Attack on the United States embassy in Baghdad 2020 Iran explosions 2021 Erbil rocket attacks 2021 Natanz incident February 2021 United States airstrike in Syria Leaked Mohammad Javad Zarif audiotape June 2021 United States airstrike in Syria July 2021 Gulf of Oman incident August 2021 Gulf of Oman incident 2021 U.S.–Iran naval incident 2022 Erbil missile attacks 2023 Northeastern Syria clashes Seizure of Suez Rajan and St Nikolas Attacks on US bases in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria during the Israel–Hamas war 2024 Erbil attack Tower 22 drone attack Iranian interference in the 2024 United States elections
Legislation	United States sanctions against Iran Maximum pressure campaign Executive Order 12170 Executive Order 12172 Executive Order 13769 reactions Trump travel ban Executive Order 13780 Executive Order 13876 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act Iran Nonproliferation Act Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act Iran Freedom and Support Act Iran Sanctions Enhancement Act Kyl–Lieberman Amendment Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act Public Law 113-100 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act Dames & Moore v. Regan United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Oil Platforms case United States v. Banki Bank Markazi v. Peterson Certain Iranian Assets Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran Alleged violations of Treaty of Amity
Groups and individuals	Iran Action Group Iran–America Society Iranian Students Association in the United States National Iranian American Council Organization of Iranian American Communities United Against Nuclear Iran Farashgard Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Jundallah Kingdom Assembly of Iran National Council of Iran National Council of Resistance of Iran People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran Elliott Abrams Kaveh L. Afrasiabi Howard Baskerville William J. Fallon Brian Hook Joseph Macmanus Robert Malley Stephen D. Mull Erwin David Rabhan Jason Rezaian Scott Ritter Craig Wadsworth Michael R. White Roxana Saberi Saeed Abedini Saeid Aboutaleb Shahram Amiri Sirous Asgari Mahmoud Reza Banki Haleh Esfandiari Amir Mirza Hekmati Ezedin Abdel Aziz Khalil Shahrzad Mirgholikhan Mohammad Hosseini Esha Momeni Mohammad Mosaddegh Baquer Namazi Siamak Namazi Sahar Nowrouzzadeh Reza Pahlavi, Crown Prince of Iran Noor Pahlavi Trita Parsi Maryam Rajavi Abdolreza Shahlaei Ali Shakeri Masoud Soleimani Morad Tahbaz Kian Tajbakhsh Karan Vafadari Xiyue Wang Nizar Zakka Iranian Guantanamo Bay detainees Abdul Majid Muhammed
Related	1998 FIFA World Cup match Academic relations between Iran and the United States American Islam Anti-American sentiment in Iran Axis of evil CIA activities in Iran Copyright relations Death to America Dual containment Great Satan International Conference on Hollywoodism Iran and state-sponsored terrorism Iranian frozen assets Opposition to military action against Iran State Sponsor of Terrorism United States involvement in regime change United States and state-sponsored terrorism 650 Fifth Avenue Alavi Foundation Alborz High School American Institute of Iranian Studies American School of Isfahan Community School, Tehran Damavand College Iran Bethel School Iranzamin School Saint Peter Church, Tehran Tehran American School "Bomb Iran" Overthrow Not for the Faint of Heart
Category

v t e
Diplomatic posts	Embassy of Iran, Moscow Embassy of Russia, Tehran Ambassadors of Russia to Iran Consulate General of Russia, Isfahan
Diplomacy	Treaty of Gulistan Treaty of Kurakchay Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1723) Treaty of Turkmenchay Anglo-Russian Convention Tehran Conference P5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Marine Security Belt
Conflicts	Russo-Persian Wars 1651–1653 1722–1723 1804–1813 1826–1828 Abbasabad Russian conquest of the Caucasus Persian Constitutional Revolution Persian Campaign Battle of Robat Karim Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran Iranian famine of 1942–1943
Incidents	1903 Isfahan anti-Baháʼí riots Siege of Tabriz (1908–1909) 1908 bombardment of the Majlis Russian occupation of Tabriz
Individuals	Abbas Mirza Mohammad Taqi Pessian Shafi Khan Qajar Ali Qulu Mirza Qajar Amir Kazim Mirza Qajar
Related	Russia and the Iran–Israel proxy conflict Axis of Resistance Funding of the Axis of Resistance Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition Iran and the Russian invasion of Ukraine Axis of Upheaval
Category:Iran–Russia relations

v t e
Diplomatic posts	Embassy of China, Washington, D.C. Ambassadors of China to the United States Embassy of the United States, Beijing Ambassadors of the United States to China Chinese Consulate-Generals New York Los Angeles Houston American Consulate-Generals Chengdu Guangzhou Hong Kong and Macau Shanghai Shenyang Wuhan Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Office of China Coordination
Diplomacy	Treaty of Wanghia Treaty of Tientsin Burlingame Treaty Gresham-Yang Treaty Shanghai International Settlement American Concession (Shanghai) United States Court for China Treaty between the United States and China for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of China Marshall Mission Loss of China China White Paper PRC-US Ambassadorial Talks 1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China Shanghai Communiqué Three Communiqués One-China policy Nixon goes to China Nixon's China Game Harvey Feldman Ling-Ling and Hsing-Hsing Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Goldwater v. Carter State visit by Deng Xiaoping to the United States Presidential Rule of Law Initiative Beijing–Washington hotline State visit by Xi Jinping to the United States 2015 United States–China Cybersecurity Agreement Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action United States–China talks in Alaska United States–China Working Group
Conflicts	Boxer Rebellion Eight-Nation Alliance China Relief Expedition Chinese Civil War Korean War Allegations of biological warfare in the Korean War Cross-Strait conflict First Taiwan Strait Crisis Operation King Kong Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Third Taiwan Strait Crisis CIA Tibetan program Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
Incidents	Rover incident Chy Lung v. Freeman Cheong Ah Moy v. United States Chae Chan Ping v. United States Twain–Ament indemnities controversy 1905 Chinese boycott USS Monocacy incident Red Scare Qian Xuesen 1946 United States Air Force C-47 Crash at Yan'an Shen Chong case Lamont v. Postmaster General Hu Na Project Sabre II Yinhe incident 1996 United States campaign finance controversy Johnny Chung Liu Chaoying United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade Hainan Island incident Operation Shady RAT Operation Aurora United States diplomatic cables leak 2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations Murder of Shao Tong Disappearance of David Louis Sneddon Trump–Tsai call Havana syndrome Animal Science Products v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals China Initiative Trial of Anming Hu Concerns over Chinese involvement in 5G wireless networks Meng Wanzhou Extradition TikTok v. Trump U.S. WeChat Users Alliance v. Trump COVID-19 misinformation United States Department of Defense China Task Force 2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan Chinese espionage in the United States Cyberwarfare by China Alleged Chinese spy cases persecuted in the United States Cox Report Timeline of the Cox Report controversy American espionage in China Hugh Francis Redmond Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo Bay 2023 balloon incident Chinese interference in the 2024 United States elections
Military relations	Yangtze Patrol Alice Dollar incident Second Sino-Japanese War American Volunteer Group Black Cat Squadron Development of Chinese Nationalist air force (1937–1945) China Air Task Force China Marines Dixie Mission Flying Tigers Operation Beleaguer Sino-American Cooperative Organization RIMPAC
Legislation	United States sanctions against China U.S. immigration policy Magnuson Act Taiwan Relations Act Executive Order 12711 Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 United States-Hong Kong Policy Act United States–Hong Kong Agreement for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders Forced Abortion Condemnation Act Taiwan Security Enhancement Act United States–China Relations Act of 2000 Wolf Amendment Taiwan Travel Act EQUITABLE Act Hong Kong Be Water Act Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act Tibet Policy and Support Act Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act Proclamation 10043 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act Hong Kong Autonomy Act Executive Order 13936 Executive Order 13959 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act Executive Order 14032 United States Innovation and Competition Act Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act
Economic relations	Old China Trade United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Group of Two Strategic Economic Dialogue Summer Palace Dialogue U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Senior Dialogue China–United States trade war (first Trump tariffs and second Trump tariffs) Permanent normal trade relations
Related	History of China–United States relations Hong Kong–United States relations Macau–United States relations Taiwan–United States relations Americans in China Chinese Americans Anti-American sentiment in mainland China Ruguanxue Anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States Chimerica China Lobby Asia First Chinese Century China Hands China watcher Cold War in Asia Second Cold War Artificial Intelligence Cold War Ping-pong diplomacy Triangular diplomacy Peaceful Evolution theory Linkage (policy) String of Pearls (Indian Ocean) Thucydides Trap Hong (business) Air route authority between the United States and China Blue Team TPE (cable system) Protestant missions in China Elijah Coleman Bridgman Divie Bethune McCartee The 1990 Institute Boxer Indemnity Scholarship China Aid Society Chinese Educational Mission Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy Congressional-Executive Commission on China Hua Yuan Science and Technology Association Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party Kissinger Institute on China and the United States National Committee on United States–China Relations Oberlin Shansi Memorial Association Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction US-China Business Council US–China Education Trust US–China Peoples Friendship Association Massachusetts International Academy Harvard Summit for Young Leaders in China International School of Beijing SARS conspiracy theory Yixian glazed pottery luohans Harvard Bixi William H. Hinton Human Rights Record of the United States USA pavilion at Expo 2010 New Federal State of China China Human Rights Biweekly Far East Reporter Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit The Coming Conflict with China A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China The New Chinese Empire The Art of Investing in America Death by China On China Peaceful War The Transpacific Experiment Stealth War: How China Took Over While America's Elite Slept Red Chinese Battle Plan The China Hustle
Category:China–United States relations

v t e
Diplomatic posts	Embassy of France, Washington, D.C. Ambassadors of France to the United States French ambassador's residence Embassy of the United States, Paris Ambassadors of the United States to France Hôtel de Pontalba French Consulate General, Atlanta French Consulate General, Miami French Consulate General, New York City French Consulate General, San Francisco Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Diplomacy	Louisiana Purchase Mellon–Berenger Agreement Treaty of Guarantee Conference of Ambassadors Blum–Byrnes agreement Washington Naval Treaty Anglo-French Financial Commission United Nations Security Council Resolution 135 Liberty Enlightening the World statue of Liberty Museum Safari Club Guadeloupe Conference Agreement Concerning the Shipwrecked Vessel RMS Titanic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2024 Israel–Lebanon ceasefire agreement
Conflicts	Quasi-War Convention of 1800
Incidents	Little v. Barreme Embargo Act of 1807 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon Blackmer v. United States Valentine v. United States Chicken tax French Guantanamo Bay detainees Michael Mastro Frédéric Pierucci
Military relations	American Revolutionary War France's role Treaty of Alliance (1778) Treaty of Amity and Commerce Franco-American alliance Roderigue Hortalez and Company France and the American Civil War United States Zouave Cadets Supreme War Council Liberation of France Rape during the liberation of France Allied Control Council Four-Power Authorities Four Power Naval Commission Alliance Base CIA activities in France United States Air Force in France Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Bulo Marer hostage rescue attempt
Related	History of France–United States relations Anti-French sentiment in the United States Cheese-eating surrender monkeys Freedom fries French language in the United States United States and the Haitian Revolution France–Republic of Texas relations French Legation Texas Legation Alliance Française de Chicago American Committee for Devastated France American Friends Musée d'Orsay April in Paris Ball CFM International Committee of American Students of the School of Beaux-Arts, Paris French-American Foundation La French Touch Conference Friendship Train Merci Train MICEFA Democracy in America 112 Gripes About the French Deauville American Film Festival Sacramento French Film Festival Place des États-Unis Prix Blumenthal Florence Meyer Blumenthal Apollo Cable System Honotua TAT-4 TAT-6 TAT-8 TAT-11 TAT-12/13
Category:France–United States relations

v t e
Diplomatic posts	Embassy of Germany, Washington, D.C. Ambassadors of Germany to the United States Embassy of the United States, Berlin Ambassadors of the United States to Germany Consular Agency of the United States, Bremen Consulate General of the United States, Hamburg Consulate General of the United States, Frankfurt Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Diplomacy	Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Relations between Germany and the United States of America Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany Guadeloupe Conference Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Conflicts	Samoan crisis Samoan Civil War Second Samoan Civil War Tripartite Convention Treaty of Berlin (1889) World War I United States declaration of war on Germany (1917) Zimmermann telegram War Plan Black Treaty of Versailles World War II German declaration of war against the United States United States declaration of war on Germany (1941) German prisoners of war in the United States Internment of German Americans Executive Order 9066 Nazism in the Americas Duquesne Spy Ring Operation Pastorius Don't Be a Sucker Here Is Germany Your Job in Germany Four Ds Morgenthau Plan The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria Allied-occupied Germany German Marshall Fund
Incidents	Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. 1960 Munich C-131 crash Berlin Crisis of 1961 1961 F-84 Thunderstreak incident 1964 T-39 shootdown incident Chicken tax Zschernig v. Miller Operation Rubicon (Crypto AG) Bitburg controversy West Berlin discotheque bombing 1991 United States embassy sniper attack in Bonn LaGrand case Price v. United States Zadvydas v. Davis Operation Eikonal 2011 Frankfurt Airport shooting
U.S. relations with former German states	East Germany–United States relations Ambassadors of East Germany to the United States Ambassadors of the United States to East Germany United States–West Germany relations Prussia–United States relations Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Prussia–United States) Prussia and the American Civil War Grand Duchy of Baden–United States relations Kingdom of Bavaria–United States relations Duchy of Brunswick-Lüneburg–United States relations Kingdom of Hanover–United States relations German Empire–United States relations Hanseatic Republics–United States relations Grand Duchy of Hesse–United States relations Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin–United States relations Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz–United States relations Duchy of Nassau–United States relations North German Confederation–United States relations Grand Duchy of Oldenburg–United States relations Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe–United States relations Kingdom of Württemberg–United States relations
Related	Anti-American sentiment in Germany Germans in the American Revolution German interest in the Caribbean Helios (spacecraft) Ich bin ein Berliner Tear down this wall! Freedom Bell STS-61-A TAT-10 Amerika Haus Amerika Haus Berlin Atlantic Initiative Atlantik-Brücke Bacatec Cultural Vistas Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Federation of German-American Clubs German-American Friendship Garden German American Partnership Program German Historical Institute Washington DC IG Farben Building Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship Program Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor
Category:Germany–United States relations

Timeline

Background

Nuclear technology

Iranian nuclear activity, 1970–2006

S.C. resolutions, 2007–2013

Joint Plan of Action (2013)

Provisions

Nuclear

Stocks

Centrifuges

Research

Reactors

Inspections

Breakout

Exemptions

Sanctions

Snapback

Dispute resolution

Expiration

International reaction

Unique elements

History

Negotiations (2014–2015)

Participants

Incorporation into international law by the Security Council

European Union

Review period in the U.S. Congress

Congress and the administration

Public discussion

Committee hearings

Congressional reactions

Congressional votes

Iranian review

Adoption Day

Implementation Day

Status in U.S. law

Deterrence

Trump administration (2017)

U.S. withdrawal (May 2018)

Consequences of U.S. withdrawal

Khamenei's conditions

Defection of Iran (2019)

Diplomatic conflict (2020)

Reentry negotiations

2021

2022

2023

2024

See also

Notes

References

External links